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Abstract—In this paper, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian
game framework for automated dynamic offset selection. Users
compete to maximize their throughput by picking the best locally
serving radio access network (RAN) with respect to their own
measurement, their demand and a partial statistical channel state
information (CSI) of other users. In particular, we investigate
the properties of a Stackelberg game, in which the base station
is a player on its own. We derive analytically the utilities
related to the channel quality perceived by users to obtain
the equilibria. We study the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of such
system, where the PoA is the ratio of the social welfare attained
when a network planner chooses policies to maximize social
welfare versus the social welfare attained in Nash/Stackeleberg
equilibrium when users choose their policies strategically. We
show by means of a Stackelberg formulation, how the operator, by
sending appropriate information about the state of the channel,
can configure a dynamic offset that optimizes its global utility
while users maximize their individual utilities. The proposed
hierarchical decision approach for wireless networks can reach
a good trade-off between the global network performance at the
equilibrium and the requested amount of signaling. Typically, it
is shown that when the network goal is orthogonal to user’s goal,
this can lead the users to a misleading association problem.
Index Terms—WLAN, 3G, association problem, misleading
information, channel state information, game theory, Bayes-Nash
equilibrium, Bayes-Stackelberg equilibrium, Price of Anarchy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Efficient design of wireless networks calls for end users
implementing radio resource management (RRM), which re-
quires knowledge of the mutual channel state information
in order to limit the influence of interference impairments
on the decision making. However, full CSI assumption is
not always practical because communicating channel gains
between different users in a time varying channel within
the channel coherence time may lead to large overhead. In
this case, it is more appropriate to consider each channel
coherence time as a one-stage game where players are only
aware of their own channel gains and their opponent’s channel
statistics (which vary slowly compared to the channel gains
and, therefore, can be communicated [1]). The interaction
between the players may be repeated but with a different
and independent channel realization each time and therefore
is not a repeated game. This motivates the use of games with
incomplete information, also known as Bayesian games [2], [3]
which have been incorporated into wireless communications
for problems such as power control [4] and spectrum manage-
ment in the interference channel [5]. In [4], a distributed uplink
power control in a multiple access (MAC) fading channel
was studied and shown to have a unique Nash equilibrium
(NE) point. With the same incomplete information, it was
shown [5] that in a symmetric interference channel with a
one-time interaction, there exists a unique symmetric strategy
profile which is a NE point. This result however is limited
to scenarios where all users statistically experience identical
channel conditions (due to the symmetry assumption) and does
not apply to interactions between weak and strong users.
In this paper, we present an alternative approach for con-
figuring a dynamic offset by introducing a certain degree of
hierarchy between the users and the base station. More specifi-
cally, we propose a Stackelberg formulation of the association
problem when a partial channel state information is assumed at
the transmitter. By Stackelberg we mean distributed decision
making assisted by the network, where the wireless users aim
at maximizing their own utility, guided by aggregated informa-
tion broadcasted by the network about the CSI of each user. We
first show how to derive the utilities of users that are related to
their respective channel quality under the different association
policies. We then derive the policy that corresponds to the
Stackelberg equilibrium and compare it to the centralized and
the non-cooperative model. Technically, our approach not only
aims at improving the network equilibrium efficiency but has
also two nice features: (i) It allows the network to guide
users to a desired equilibrium that optimizes its own utility
if it chooses the adequate information to send, (ii) Only the
individual user demand and a partial statistical CSI of other
users is needed at each transmitter. Our approach contributes
to designing networks where intelligence is split between the
base station (BS) and mobile stations (MSs) in order to find
a desired trade-off between the global network performance
reached at the equilibrium and the amount of signaling needed
to make it work. Note that the Stackelberg formulation arises
naturally in some contexts of practical interest. For example,
hierarchy is naturally present in contexts where there are
primary (licensed) users and secondary (unlicensed) users who
can sense their environment because there are equipped with
a radio [6]. It is also natural if the users have access to the
medium in an asynchronous manner.
Moreover, this game has an unusual information: it is partial
and misleading. Misleading - because, although the channel
state indeed can give information on the transmission rate, it is
known that the actual throughput of a given user is a function
of not only his channel state but also of that of the other
connected users [7]. The throughput is known to be lower
bounded by the harmonic mean of the rates available to each
user [8]. Thus the nodes transmitting at higher rate is degraded
below the level of lower bit rate. The real utility of a given
user is the throughput he would get and the user may not
be aware that it is possible that an access point with a better
channel may have a lower throughput because more terminals
are connected to it.
From the system design perspective, the given model is
very useful in practice. Recently, papers like [9] raises the
cell reselection process problem in HetNets. Clearly, the
association based on highest signal strength is inadequate to
address this challenge. Moreover, in the 3GPP RRC standard
[10] in Section 5.1.5 it is clearly said that the E-UTRAN can
configure a list of cell specific offsets and a list of blacklisted
cells. Typically, Release 8 UEs should apply the ranking based
on radio link quality (with offsets) unless operator indicates
support for priority-based reselection. This suggests that the
offset can be configured for each and every cell depending
on the priority set by the operator (e.g., mobility, requested
throughput, amount of signalling).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a heterogeneous wireless system consisting of a
single MAN (Metropolitan Area Network, e.g. 3G) cell and
an overlapping wireless LAN (Local Area Networks, e.g.
WiFi) hot-spot. Each user entering in the system will decide
individually to which of the available systems it is best to
connect according to its radio condition, its demand and the
statistical information about other users. Their policies (or
strategies) are then based on this (incomplete) information.
The association problem is then generalized to allow the BS
to control the users’ behavior by broadcasting appropriate
information, expected to maximize its utility while individual
users maximize their own utility.
σ2 is the noise variance. bi is the demand of user i (bi = 1
when there exists a demand, and 0 otherwise) and ai his
action defined by the user decision to connect to a certain
radio access technology (RAT). ai = 1 when the user chooses
3G, and 0 when the user chooses WiFi. hi is the downlink
channel power gain between the 3G BS and the end-terminal.
The channel gains could be either independent or correlated
over the n users. We assume that all channels are independent
and undergo Rayleigh fading. By the transformation theorem
for single random variable, the channel power gain hi has an
exponential distribution with mean λi [11]. We will see later
how λi is related to different parameters adopted throughout
the paper. We assume that the user state is defined by the
pair (hi, bi). The network is fully characterized by the user
state. However, when distributing the JRRM decisions, this
complete information is not available to the users. The BS and
the AP broadcasts to its terminals an aggregated information
indicating a measurement of the communication quality of
the wireless channel (excellent, fair, poor. . . ). This can be
done through an offset which we will also call in the sequel
interchangeably as the Channel Quality Indicator (CQI). The
CQI can be a value (or values) representing a measure of
channel quality for a given channel. Typically, a high value
CQI is indicative of a channel with high quality and vice
versa. More formally, assume that the knowledge of each
user about his own state is limited to the pair (si, bi), where
si = 1I{hi>Ψi}, with Ψ – a fixed threshold which represents
the dynamic offset parameter set by the 3G BS and 1IC is the
indicator function equal to 1 if condition C is satisfied and
to 0 otherwise. We will call Ψi the ”CQI threshold” of user
i. Thus, a user only knows whether he wants to transmit and
whether the channel is in a good (si = 1) or in a bad (si = 0)
condition given the CQI threshold. In addition any player has
the information about the probability distribution of his own
state (si, bi) and that of his opponent (sj , bj). These are given
by αi – the probability to have {hi > Ψi}, and βi – the
probability that bi = 1. Let us denote by P = [P1, . . . ,Pn]T
the (n×2) policy profile matrix, whose element Pi represents
the action vector taken by the mobile i in low and high channel
states for i = 1, . . . , n.
In the next sections, we provide a thorough analysis of the
existence and characterization of the Bayes equilibria for both
non-cooperative and Stackelberg scenarios. We first focus on
the two-user case in order to gain insights into how to design
decision problem in radio environments. Then, we generalize
our approach to the multi-user case.
A. WiFi Throughput
The measurement of average throughput of a node in a
wireless LAN is done by the time it takes to transfer the files
between the WiFi access point (AP) and the wireless clients.
Typically, one would transfer a file from a wired server to a
wireless client by means of an AP bridging wired and wireless
networks. The throughput depends on the bit rate at which the
wireless mobile communicates to its AP. On the other hand,
as already mentioned, if there is at least one host with a lower
rate, a WLAN network presents a performance anomaly in
the sense that the throughput of all the hosts transmitting at
higher rate is degraded below the level of the lower rate [7],
[8], [12]. We can accordingly consider that the throughput of
a WiFi connection is equal to a constant, say v, regardless of
differences in users’ channel data rate.
B. 3G Throughput
As opposed to WiFi, the 3G technology uses CDMA
multiplexing. Hence, each user receives a certain number of
codes which are converted into a certain amount of throughput
depending on the chosen modulation and coding scheme,
which greatly depends on the link quality at the receiver
side. This can vary greatly depending on the link conditions
due to interference and noise impairments. We then model
the utility experienced by a user that is connected to 3G
by the capacity of Shannon [13]. Assuming that there is no
interference between 3G and the WiFi network, the throughput
of a user connected to 3G system is given by:
ThpCi = log
(
1 +
p hi ai bi
σ2 + p hj aj bj
)
; j 6= i (1)
where index C stands for 3G cellular network.
As can be seen, the throughput obtained by a user in a
system depends on both his own decisions and the decisions
taken by the other users. Given λi and Ψi, we can compute
that the distribution of hi is Exp(λi) with
αi = exp(−λiΨi) (2)
Given the information that a player has, there are four possible
policies of a player i with bi = 1 (we do not consider state
bi = 0, when there is no transmission of any type):
hi < Ψi W W C C
hi > Ψi W C W C
where index W stands for WiFi network. Let us not consider
the policy (C,W ), which is irrational, as the throughput of a
player using 3G when {hi > Ψi} is certainly higher than that
when {hi < Ψi}. We then have a game with partial CSI with
two states and a (3 × 3) matrix in every state.
For the ease of comprehension, we will begin by considering
the two-user case and then generalize the results to the multi-
user case later in Section IV.
III. THE TWO-USER CASE
User i’s utility in state s = 0, 1 is given by
ui(s,P) =
{
v; if user i chooses W at state s,
Ci
Pj
(s); if user i chooses C at state s (3)
The functions Cik, describing the utility of player i using 3G
when his opponent applies policy k, are defined as follows
Cik(1) = E[c
i
k(hi)|hi > Ψi] =
1
αi
∫ ∞
Ψi
cik(hi)λie
−λihi dhi,
Cik(0) = E[c
i
k(hi)|hi < Ψi] =
1
1− αi
∫ Ψi
0
cik(hi)λie
−λihi dhi,
with k = WW,WC,CC.
cik(hi) above is the utility of player i using C when channel
gain is hi against policy k of player j. These utilities are
defined as follows:
ciCC(hi) = βj
∫ ∞
0
log
(
1 +
phi
σ2 + phj
)
λje
−λjhjdhj+
(1− βj)
∫ ∞
0
log
(
1 +
phi
σ2
)
λje
−λjhjdhj
(4)
Next:
ciWC(hi) = βj
∫ ∞
Ψj
log
(
1 +
phi
σ2 + phj
)
λje
−λjhjdhj+
(1− βj)
∫ ∞
Ψj
log
(
1 +
phi
σ2
)
λje
−λjhjdhj+∫ Ψj
0
log
(
1 +
phi
σ2
)
λje
−λjhjdhj
(5)
Finally:
ciWW (hi) = log
(
1 +
phi
σ2
)
(6)
A. The non-cooperative equilibrium
Game theory has accentuated the importance of randomized
games or mixed games. However, such a game does not find
a significant role in most communication modems and source
coding codecs since equilibria where each user randomly picks
a decision at each time epoch are unfortunately not interesting
in such a case, as they amount to perpetual handover between
networks. In what follows, we will make use of the users’ util-
ities obtained above to derive the pure association strategies.
Definition 1 (Bayes-Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile
Pi
BNE
, ∀i = 1, 2 corresponds to a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
(BNE) if, for all users, any unilateral switching to a different
strategy cannot improve user’s payoff at any state. Mathemat-
ically, this can be expressed by the following inequality, given
the statistical information about the other user ∀Qi 6= PiBNE
ui(si, (Pi
BNE ,PBNE−i )) ≥ ui(si, (Qi,PBNE−i )); for si = 0, 1
Proposition 1. The game considered in the paper always has
a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Moreover
(a) (CC,CC) is an equilibrium iff CiCC(0) ≥ v for i = 1, 2.
(b) (CC,WC) is an equilibrium iff C1WC(0) ≥ v and
C2CC(0) ≤ v ≤ C
2
CC(1).
(c) (CC,WW ) is an equilibrium iff C1WW (0) ≥ v and
C2CC(1) ≤ v.
(d) (WC,CC) is an equilibrium iff C1CC(0) ≤ v ≤ C1CC(1)
and C2WC(0) ≥ v.
(e) (WC,WC) is an equilibrium iff CiWC(0) ≤ v ≤ CiWC(1)
for i = 1, 2.
(f) (WC,WW ) is an equilibrium iff C1WW (0) ≤ v ≤
C1WW (1) and C2WC(1) ≤ v.
(g) (WW,CC) is an equilibrium iff C1CC(1) ≤ v and
C2WW (0) ≥ v.
(h) (WW,WC) is an equilibrium iff C1WC(1) ≤ v and
C2WW (0) ≤ v ≤ C
2
WW (1).
(i) (WW,WW ) is an equilibrium iff CiWW (1) ≤ v for i =
1, 2.
Proof: The statements (a)–(i) are direct consequences of
the definition of Bayes-Nash equilibrium and the form of
payoff matrices. Next, it is immediate to see that the definitions
of Cik(s) imply the following inequalities:
CiCC(s) < C
i
WC(s) < C
i
WW (s)
for i = 1, 2 and s = 0, 1. Now, using these inequalities, it is
tedious but straightforward to show that always at least one of
the conditions (a)–(i) is satisfied.
The next proposition gives us some information on how
the Nash-Bayes equilibria depend on the chosen values of
the CQI thresholds Ψi. Form a simple analysis, we can come
up with the following informations on how the Nash-Bayes
equilibria depend on the chosen values of the CQI thresholds
Ψi.
Proposition 2. If Ψ1 and Ψ2 are small enough none of the
players uses CC in equilibrium. If they are large enough, none
of the players uses policy WW in equilibrium. Moreover, for
all the values of the parameters of the model one of the two
possibilities is true:
(a) For Ψ1 and Ψ2 small enough at least one of the players
uses policy WW in equilibrium,
(b) For Ψ1 and Ψ2 large enough at least one of the players
uses policy CC in equilibrium.
More discussion on this result is given in [14].
Proof: Define for i = 1, 2 and k = CC,WC,WW
Cik(∞) =
∫ ∞
0
cik(hi)λie
−λihi dhi (7)
Note that when Ψ1 → 0 and Ψ2 → 0, Cik(0)(Ψ1,Ψ2) →
0 and Cik(1)(Ψ1,Ψ2) → Cik(∞) for i = 1, 2, k =
CC,WC,WW . Analogously, when Ψ1 →∞ and Ψ2 → ∞,
Cik(0)(Ψ1,Ψ2) → C
i
k(∞) and 1 Cik(1)(Ψ1,Ψ2) → +∞.
Thus for Ψ1 and Ψ2 small enough, Cik(0)(Ψ1,Ψ2) < v for all
the values of i and k, which by Proposition 1 implies that no
player uses policy CC in equilibrium. Analogously for Ψ1,
Ψ2 big enough, Cik(0)(Ψ1,Ψ2) > v for all the values of i and
k, and thus no player uses WW in equilibrium then.
Now note that by Proposition 1, one of the players uses CC
in equilibrium iff
C1WC(0) ≥ v or C
2
WC(0) ≥ v.
Thus if we take Ψ1, Ψ2 large enough, we can pass to the limit:
C1WC(∞) ≥ v or C
2
WC(∞) ≥ v. (8)
Analogously, one of the players uses WW in equilibrium iff
C1WC(1) ≤ v or C
2
WC(1) ≤ v.
Passing to the limit when Ψ1, Ψ2 approach 0,
C1WC(∞) ≤ v or C
2
WC(∞) ≤ v. (9)
1To prove that Ci
k
(0)(Ψ1,Ψ2) → 0 and Cik(1)(Ψ1,Ψ2) → +∞ it
is enough to notice that the conditional expected values (III) and (III) are
bounded from above and from below respectively by the biggest value of ci
k
on the set {hi : hi < Ψi} and the smallest one on the set {hi : hi > Ψi}.
Note however that the former is bounded from above by log
(
1+ phi
σ2
)
which
converges to 0 as hi → 0. Then the latter one is bounded from below by
(1 − βj)
∫
∞
0
log
(
1 +
phi
σ2
)
λje
−λjhjdhj = (1 − βj) log
(
1 +
phi
σ2
)
,
which clearly goes to infinity as hi →∞.
However (8) and (9) cover all the values of v, ending the proof.
Roughly speaking, this means that for higher values of the
CQI thresholds Ψis the players are more likely to use 3G
rather than WiFi and conversely, for low values of the CQI
thresholds Ψis the players are more likely to use WiFi rather
than 3G. Interestingly, this result also suggests that, rather
than increasing the offered throughput v, the operator could
control the equilibrium of its wireless users to maximize its
own revenue by broadcasting appropriate CQI thresholds. 2.
This can lead the network to minimize its overall cost and
users to a misleading association problem. Next, we address
this problem by introducing a hierarchical model.
B. The hierarchical equilibrium
In this section, we propose a methodology that transforms
the above non-cooperative game into a Stackelberg game.
Concretely, the network may guide users to an equilibrium that
optimizes its own utility if it chooses the adequate information
to send. We first study the policy that maximizes the utility
of the network, which is defined as the expected number of
active users connected to 3G network, which for two users can
be defined as follows:
UBS(P,Ψ1,Ψ2) = β1(1I{P1=CC} + α11I{P1=WC})+
β2(1I{P2=CC} + α21I{P2=WC})
= β1(1I{P1=CC} + e
−λ1Ψ11I{P1=WC})+
β2(1I{P2=CC} + e
−λ2Ψ21I{P2=WC})
Nevertheless, as it is not realistic to consider that the users
will seek the global optimum, we show how to find the policy
that corresponds to the Bayes-Stackelberg equilibrium where
the BS tries to maximize its own utility UBS just by choosing
the CQI thresholds, knowing that users will try to maximize
their individual utilities.
Definition 2 (Bayes-Stackelberg equilibrium). By denoting
(Ψ1
BSE ,Ψ2
BSE) the strategy profile of the BS at a Bayes-
Stackelberg equilibrium (BSE), this definition translates math-
ematically as
(Ψ1
BSE ,Ψ2
BSE) ⊂ arg max
Ψ1,Ψ2
UBS(P
BNE(Ψ1,Ψ2),Ψ1,Ψ2),
(10)
where PBNE(Ψ1,Ψ2) is any Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the
game of the previous section with CQI thresholds equal to Ψ1,
Ψ2.
2Of course there are some limits of the possible influence of the operator.
As it is clearly seen from the proof given above, the situation when users
always choose WiFi for small values of the given CQI thresholds and 3G for
the big ones is not possible – the possible situations are the following: when
the value of Ψi is small, the player chooses WiFi below this threshold (and
so he does it with a low probability) and 3G above this threshold. When Ψi
gets bigger it ceases to provide any information to the player and thus he
chooses 3G both below and above Ψi, which means that he still chooses 3G
with a higher probability. The second possible situation is that for a low value
of Ψi player i chooses WiFi for both his states, while for a high value of
Ψi he distinguishes between these states by choosing either 3G or WiFi, but
again for any value of the CQI threshold the probability that WiFi is used is
smaller than that of using 3G.
We next exemplify our general analysis by investigating the
possibility of considering three scenarios for the choice of Ψ1
and Ψ2:
1) Centralized model – the base station chooses both Ψis
and the policies for the players, aiming to maximize the
expected number of players using 3G in the second stage.
Formally, the centralized strategy is the one satisfying
(Ψ1
C ,Ψ2
C ,PC) ⊂ arg max
Ψ1,Ψ2,P
UBS(P,Ψ1,Ψ2),
2) Stackelberg model – there are two stages: at the first one
the base station chooses both Ψis given the information
about the distributions of (hi, bi) aiming to maximize
the expected number of players using 3G at the second
stage, when players play the game from the last section.
The proposed approach can be seen as intermediate
scheme between the centralized model and the fully non-
cooperative model,
3) Fully non-cooperative model – the game has two stages:
at the first one, players choose their Ψis given the
information they have about the distributions of (hi, bi)
aiming to maximize their expected throughput at the
second stage; at the second stage they choose a policy
depending on actual (si, bi) as in the model of the last
section. Formally, a fully non-cooperative strategy is any
one satisfying
ΨNCi ⊂ argmax
Ψi
E[ui(si,P
BNE(Ψi,Ψ
NC
j ))]; for i = 1, 2
with PBNE(Ψi,ΨNCj ) being any Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium in the game of the previous section.
Below, we analyze the behavior of the base station and the
players at the equilibria of each of these models.
Proposition 3.
1) In the centralized model, the base station chooses any Ψ1
and Ψ2, and CC policies for both users.
2) In the Stackelberg model, when CiCC(∞) > v for i =
1, 2 then the base station chooses any Ψ1 > Ψ∗∗1 and
Ψ2 > Ψ
∗∗
2 with Ψ∗∗i satisfying3 C1CC(0)(Ψ∗∗1 ) = v and
C2CC(0)(Ψ
∗∗
2 ) = v and then users both play CC.
When CiCC(∞) ≤ v for i = 1 or i = 2, then the base
station chooses Ψ∗∗∗i , for i = 1, 2 maximizing4 either
β1e
−λ1Ψ1 + β2e
−λ2Ψ2
subject to CiWC(1)(Ψ1,Ψ2) ≥ v ≥ CiWC(0)(Ψ1,Ψ2),
i = 1, 2 or maximizing
βi + βje
−λjΨj
subject to CiWC(0)(Ψ1,Ψ2) ≥ v and CjCC(1)(Ψ1,Ψ2) ≥
v. In the first case, both players choose WC in the second
stage. In the second case, user j chooses WC and user
i chooses CC.
3Here and in the sequel Ci
k
(s)(Ψ1,Ψ2) denotes the respective Cik(s) when
the values of Ψis have the given value.
4Of course the one of the two with the higher objective function is chosen
– its value is the BS utility at equilibrium.
3) In the fully non-cooperative model, the players in equi-
librium choose Ψ1 = Ψ∗1 and Ψ2 = Ψ∗2 satisfying
c1WC(Ψ
∗
1) = v = c
2
WC(Ψ
∗
2) (11)
and then both use a WC policy.
What we see in this proposition is that when the BS can
decide on the behavior of the users, it forces them to use 3G.
In other cases (when users can decide on their behavior, but are
given only partial information), the users’ interest is to choose
the CQI thresholds somewhere in the middle of the channel
gain range. This can be seen as a desired trade-off between
the global network performance at the equilibrium and the
individual efficiency of all the users. On the other hand, the
BS has an incentive to choose CQI thresholds either very high
(first case in the Stackelberg scenario) or very low (the second
case). Both these choices give little information for the user
about actual channel condition, which is precisely what he
wants to avoid. It is interesting and somewhat surprising that
the optimal policy of the BS in the Stackelberg game can be
both giving high or low values of CQI thresholds. This can
however be explained when we understand the meaning of
these two situations – very high value of the threshold means
that no information about the channel state is given. In this
case, when both users connect to 3G, this corresponds to the
choice of the BS. Now, if in the ”no information” case players
choose WiFi, then the base station tries to divide the range of
hi into a small (in terms of probability) part when the players
use WiFi and, a large one when they use 3G. This is done
by giving the lowest possible CQI threshold above which the
players would have an incentive to use rather 3G than WiFi.
This explains why the BS has an incentive to choose CQI
thresholds very low in this case.
The final two results of this section are given without proofs,
which are straightforward.
Corollary 1. Note that the maximum network utility, obtained
in scenario 1) is equal to β1 + β2. Obviously the utilities
obtained in the other two scenarios always satisfy
β1 + β2 ≥ UBS(P
BSE ,ΨBSEi ,Ψ
BSE
j )
> UBS(P
NC ,ΨNCi ,Ψ
NC
j ) > 0
(12)
The important fact the corollary implies is that the users
never choose the same way the base station would, but their
interests however need not be necessarily contradicting. In the
second corollary, we give the method to compute the price of
anarchy(PoA) [15][16] for our model.
The PoA measures how good the system performance is
when users play selfishly and reach the NE instead of playing
to achieve the social optimum [15][16]. Note that as the
maximum network utility which can be obtained is β1 + β2,
the price of anarchy when players use strategy profile P is
PoA =
β1 + β2
UBS(P,Ψ1,Ψ2)
.
Thus, Proposition 3 implies that
Corollary 2. The price of anarchy in the Stackelberg model
equals 1 whenever CiCC(∞) > v for i = 1, 2. When for some
i, CiCC(∞) ≤ v, then the price of anarchy is equal to the
smaller of the two values:
min
Ck
WC
(1)(Ψ1,Ψ2)≥v≥CkWC(0)(Ψ1,Ψ2),k=1,2
β1 + β2
β1e−λ1Ψ1 + β2e−λ2Ψ2
,
min
Ci
WC
(0)(Ψ1,Ψ2)≥v,C
j
CC
(1)(Ψ1,Ψ2)≥v
β1 + β2
βi + βje−λjΨj
.
In fully non-cooperative model,
PoA =
β1 + β2
β1e−λ1Ψ
∗
1 + β2e−λ2Ψ
∗
2
,
where Ψ∗1 and Ψ∗2 satisfy (11).
The above corollary is just a rewriting of the Proposition 3
using different language.
IV. THE MULTI-USER CASE
Now let us consider the case where instead of two we
have n users choosing to connect either to WiFi or to 3G
network. Again we assume that the information about the
channel quality that user i possesses is limited to that about
the distributions of states (sj , bi) of each of the players
(including i), that is about αj (or λj ) and βj and to exact
information about his own current state (si, bi) (but not about
exact value of hi). Our additional assumption about the model
considered in this section is that the model is symmetric, that
is all the values βi, λi and Ψi defining it, are the same for
each of the players (and equal to β, λ and Ψ respectively).
This significantly simplifies the notation without any serious
limitation of generality (we believe that some counterparts of
all our results will be true also for asymmetric model).
To define the utilities of the players first let us redefine
throughput for each system:
ThpCi = log
(
1 +
p hi ai bi
σ2 + p
∑
j 6=i hj aj bj
)
(13)
ThpW = v (14)
Again we assume that each of the players uses one of the
three policies WW,WC,CC, where first letter stands for a
player’s action when his channel is bad, and the second one
when his channel is good. As it is troublesome to write down
the policies for each of n players, we will make use of the
fact that the game is symmetric, writing instead of the policy
profile a policy statistics K = [kCC , kWC ] with kCC denoting
the number of players applying policy CC and KWC – of
players applying WC. Of course the number of those using
policy WW is n− kCC − kWC , so we will omit it. Given K,
we can define user i’s utility in state s = 0, 1 as5
ui(s,K) =
{
v; if user i chooses W at state s,
Ci
K−i
(s); if user i chooses C at state s
(15)
5Notation K
−i used below denotes policy statistics defined as in the two-
user case but without policy of user i.
where the functions Ci
K−i
, describing the utility of player i
using 3G when his opponents use policies described by K,
are similarly as for the two-user case:
CiK−i(1) = E[c
i
K−i
(hi)|hi > Ψ]
=
1
αi
∫ ∞
Ψi
ci
K−i
(hi)λie
−λihi dhi,
(16)
Ci
K−i
(0) = E[ci
K−i
(hi)|hi < Ψ]
=
1
1− αi
∫ Ψi
0
ci
K−i
(hi)λie
−λihi dhi.
(17)
Next, the functions ci
K−i
, defining utility of player i using C
when channel gain is hi against policies K of his opponents,
can be written as6:
ci[k1,k2](h) =
k1∑
r=0
k2∑
q=0
q∑
v=0
βr+q(1 − β)k1+k2−r−q
(
k1
r
)(
k2
q
)
(
q
v
)∫
[Ψ,∞)v×Rn−q−1×[0,Ψ)q−v
e−λ
∑n−1
j=1 hj
log
(
1 + ph
σ2+p
∑r+v
j=1 hj
)
λn−1dh1 . . . dhn−1
Below, we give a generalization of Proposition 1 for the
n-user case.
Proposition 4. The symmetric n-user game considered in the
paper always has a pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium of
one of six types:
(a) When Ci[0,0](1) ≤ v then the profile where all the players
use policy WW is an equilibrium.
(b) When Ci[0,k−1](1) ≥ v ≥ Ci[0,k](1) and Ci[0,k−1](0) ≤ v,
then any profile where k players use policy WC and all
the others play WW is an equilibrium.
(c) When Ci[0,n−1](1) ≥ v and Ci[0,n−1](0) ≤ v then the pro-file where all the players use policy WC is an equilibrium.
(d) When Ci[k,n−k−1](1) ≥ v and Ci[k−1,n−k](0) ≥ v ≥
Ci[k,n−k−1](0) then any profile where k players apply
policy CC and the remaining n − k players use policy
WC is an equilibrium.
(e) When Ci[n−1,0](0) ≥ v then the profile where all the
players use policy CC is an equilibrium.
(f) When Ci[k−1,n−k](0) ≥ v ≥ Ci[k,n−k−1](1) then any pro-file where k players apply policy CC and the remaining
n− k players use policy WW is an equilibrium.
It may also have another pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium
with k players using CC and l < n − k using WC when
Ci[k,l−1](1) ≥ v ≥ C
i
[k,l](1) and Ci[k−1,l](0) ≥ v.
6Of course this formula is a generalization of the formulas for ci
k
given
in section III and it applies for any n ≥ 2, in particular ci
CC
≡ ci
[1,0]
,
ci
WC
≡ ci
[0,1]
and ci
WW
≡ ci
[0,0]
when n = 2 and players are symmetric.
We give a corollary to this proposition. It gives a kind
of consistency property for equilibria in games for different
values of n.
Corollary 3.
(a) Suppose that a profile where at least one player uses policy
WW and the number of players using policies CC and
WC is k is an equilibrium in n-user symmetric game.
Then it is also an equilibrium in any m-user game defined
with the same parameters β, λ and Ψ and m ≥ k.
(b) Moreover for any fixed parameters β, λ and Ψ there exists
an n such that for any m > n at least m−n players use
policy WW in any equilibrium in m-user game.
Proof: Note that Ci[k1,k2](s) does not depend on the
number of players in the game n, only on the number of those
who use one of the policies WC or CC. Just this implies part
(a). Part (b) is due to the fact that Ci[0,n−1](1)→ 0 as n→∞.
The next proposition generalizes the results for hierarchical
model included in Proposition 3 for n-user symmetric games.
We only consider scenarios 1) and 2) discussed there, as it is
difficult to apply scenario 3) to the symmetric model. The BS
utility, defined as before, as the expected number of players
using 3G network, can be now written as:
UBS([k1, k2],Ψ) = β(k1 + e
−λΨk2).
Proposition 5.
1) In the centralized model, the base station chooses any
value of Ψ and CC policies for all the users.
2) In the Stackelberg model the base station computes for
every k ≤ n
Ci[k−1,0](∞) :=
∫ ∞
0
ci[k−1,0](h)λe
−λhdh
and
Ci[0,k−1](∞) :=
∫ ∞
0
ci[0,k−1](h)λe
−λhdh,
and finds k∗ and n∗ such that
Ci[k∗−1,0](∞) ≥ v ≥ C
i
[k∗,0](∞)
and
Ci[0,n∗−1](∞) ≥ v ≥ C
i
[0,n∗](∞)
Next:
(a) If n ≤ k∗ then at the equilibrium the base station
chooses any Ψ such that Ci[n−1,0](0)(Ψ) > v and all
the players use policy CC.
(b) If n > k∗ then the base station computes for any k
such that k∗ ≤ k ≤ min{n, n∗} and any 0 ≤ l ≤ k,
a Ψ(k, l) such that
min{Ci[l,k−l−1](1)(Ψ(k, l)), C
i
[l−1,k−l](0)(Ψ(k.l))} = v.
If such a Ψ(k, l) does not exist, or v < Ci[l,k−l](1)
and k < n, then it puts P (k, l) = 0. Otherwise it
computes
P (k, l) = β(l + e−λΨ(k,l)(k − l)).
Finally it chooses kmax and lmax with the biggest
value of P (k, l) (which equals the BS utility at
equilibrium). The choice of Ψ(kmax, lmax) at the first
stage and any profile of policies where lmax players
use policy CC and kmax − lmax play WC will then
be an equilibrium.
We give one corollary to this proposition.
Corollary 4. The price of anarchy in the n-user Stackelberg
model can be computed as
PoA =
nβ
UBS(K,Ψ)
(where nβ is the maximum value of the base station’s utility
obtained in scenario 1) of Proposition 5), and is either equal
to 1 when k ≤ k∗, or satisfies
PoA = min
k∗≤k≤n,k≤n∗,0≤l≤k
nβ
P (k, l)
with k∗ and n∗ defined as in Proposition 5. For n > n∗ it
grows to infinity linearly.
The first part of this corollary is again just a rewriting
of the results from Proposition 5 with the stress made on
network utilities rather than strategies of the players. It shows
that exactly the same procedure, used to find the equilibrium
policies, can be applied to evaluate the performance of the
network.
The second part of the corollary (unbounded increase of
PoA for n∗) is a consequence of the fact that adding each new
player to the game gives the BS more patterns of behavior of
the users which can be stimulated by a proper choice of Ψ
only up to the threshold number of players n∗. From then on
no new player in the game is interested in using 3G network,
because for such a large number of players the throughput
would be too degraded, regardless of how good the channel
would be.
If someone is interested not in finding the equilibria for all
the numbers of players, but only in the limit number of players
for which the base station can lead the players to the desired
equilibrium just by a proper choice of the CQI threshold, he
may instead of computing k∗ given above an upper bound can
be computed as given below.
Corollary 5. The value k∗ appearing above can be bounded
from above by k∗∗ = max{ 2
β
+ 1, k+} with k+ satisfying
λ
2
e−
(k+−1)β2
2
∫ ∞
0
log
(
1+
ph
σ2
)
e−λhdh+log
( (k+ − 1)β
(k+ − 1)β − 2
)
= v.
This last bound cannot be given in a closed form, but it can
be computed much faster than k∗.
V. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
We consider a simple scenario of an operator providing
subscribers with a service available through a large 3G cell
coexisting with a WiFi access point with constant throughput
v. As mentioned before, users are characterized by the distri-
bution of their 3G downlink channel and the distribution of
their demand. We consider for each user a Rayleigh distributed
channel fading. In order to validate our theoretical findings,
we obtain users’ actions at the equilibrium defined by users
decisions to connect to WiFi or 3G at low/high channel
state. In order to provide with extensive results we study
the scenario of the multi-users case with increasing number
of users. This scheme allows us to address the proposed
distributed decision making problem and gain insights into
how to design association policies in such a radio environment.
Without loss of generality, we set λ = 0.6 as average
channel state for all users and consider normalized user’s
CQI threshold Ψ ∈ [0, 1]. Unless otherwise stated, for all
numerical applications, we assume the following numerical
normalized values: v = 0.25 Mbits/sec, β = 0.5 and α
derives from λ and Ψ. It is then possible to compute the non-
cooperative Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategies and the related
users’ utilities obtained at the equilibrium. For the hierarchical
Stackelberg equilibrium, given the action of the BS, i.e., the
CQI threshold Ψ, we compute the best-response function of
the mobile users, i.e., the action of the mobile users which
maximizes their utilities given the action of the 3G BS. The
network utility is defined as the average throughput obtained
by a user selecting the 3G BS. Finally, under the formerly
defined policy statistics K = {k, l}, the ratio number of user
connected to system S (with S = C for the macro-cell and
S = W for the WiFi AP), L(S), can be respectively expressed
as follows: L(C) = (k+ lα)/n and L(W ) = (n− k− lα)/n.
We first notice that, different equilibria can be archived
based on the different scenarios as Proposition 5 points out.
Secondly, we indeed observe that in the centralized case,
no matter the number of interacting users, the base station
always drive the users to select CC for any value of Ψ.
Meanwhile, as claimed in Prop. 5, we find that for low values
of n ≤ k∗, the hierarchical framework drives the users to
select the CC strategy when the channel quality threshold
satisfies the inequality condition of the proposition. It means
that when the channel is good enough to have better utility
all users should select to attach with the base station for low
number of users. As Ψ increases, users tends to connect to
3G using policy WC. Asymptotically, when Ψ grows large,
users choose policy CC at the equilibrium. This is illustrated
in Figure 1 that depicts the load of both systems when Ψ
increases.
It can be observed that as Ψ increases users choose to
connect to 3G, increasing abruptly 3G load. This is due to the
fact that for low values of Ψ, users may know that the channel
is in a really bad state when the channel state is ”bad” but do
not know much about the quality of the channel when the state
is ”good”. On the other way, when Ψ is very high, ”good”
channel state means that the channel is in a very good state,
and ”bad” channel state means hardly any information about
the channel quality. Accordingly, for low values of Ψ users
always choose WiFi in ”bad” state and for high value of Ψ
always choose 3G in ”good” state. This suggests that knowing
the distribution of the channel (through α), one can maximize
the user throughput by correctly choosing the CQI threshold.
The same observation is done for higher values of n > k∗ in
figure 2, but here the threshold value of Ψ is clearly identified
by the conditions of Prop. 5. At this point, although higher
values of Ψ describe a better channel conditions, following
this information is already misleading to users due to the large
number of interacting users.
Interestingly, we have shown in this paper by means of a
Stackelberg formulation that in order to make users connecting
to 3G network, the BS could control the CQI thresholds
rather than increasing the offered throughput. As a result, the
operator not only obtains a better revenue at no additional cost
but also significantly improves its energy efficiency.
To go further with the analysis, we resort to study the
PoA of the considered configurations of hierarchical and
centralized schemes for numerically evaluated examples in
order to give insight on the performance of the proposed
hierarchical approach. From Figure 3, we may draw that the
PoA is equal to 1 before k∗ as the hierarchically coordinated
actions of 3G BS and users allow to identify not only the actual
channel quality and traduces in good users’ utility due to low
number of users interacting. From k∗ to n∗ (defined in Prop.
5) as stated before, by increasing the number of users, each
new user to the game gives the BS more patterns of behavior
of the users which can be stimulated by a proper choice of
Ψ but only up to a number n = n∗. In our simulations, for
n > n∗ = 41 because of the large number of interacting users,
the 3G BS throughput is so degraded that no new user will
connect with the 3G regardless of how good is the channel.
This is traduced in the figure 3 by a linear increase of the
PoA.
These price of anarchy results offer hope that such a robust
and accurate modeling can be designed around competition,
because Stackelberg behavior does not arbitrarily degrade the
mechanism’s performance like the selfish does. However we
have identified a threshold number of users above which no
successful coordination can be achieved.
VI. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the fact that in game theory it is well known
that performance at equilibrium is not monotone increasing
in the amount of information, we have proposed a hierar-
chical association method that combines benefits from both
decentralized and centralized design in which the network
operator dynamically chooses the offset about the state of the
channel. The results of this study lead naturally to several
lines of future investigation. The users’ decision making is
based on partial information that is signaled to the mobiles
by the base station. A central design aspect is then for the
base stations to decide how to aggregate information which
then determines what to signal to the users. In this setting, we
have shown that, in order to maximize its revenue, the network
operator rather than increasing its offered throughput (which
is costly) has an incentive to choose channel quality indicator
thresholds either very low or very high. This may make the
information given to the user when attempting to connect
misleading since the throughput of a user cannot be directly
inferred from the quality of his channel but also depends on the
channel quality indicator thresholds (offsets) the base station
broadcasts. In particular, there may be different equilibria
(so different outcomes) depending on what information the
base station broadcasts to users. We have finally analyzed
the global performance indicators of the network. It shows
that exactly the same procedure, used to find the equilibrium
policies, can be applied to evaluate the performance of the
network. Typically, we have characterized the price of anarchy
on which we have derived an upper bound. It has been shown
that the proposed approach provides a reasonable trade-off
between centralized vs decentralized optimization in terms of
the signaling overhead and the resulting network throughput
performance.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof:
1) is obvious and needs no explanation.
2) Since when Ψ1 → ∞ and Ψ2 → ∞, CiCC(1)(Ψ1,Ψ2) →
CiCC(∞) for i = 1, 2, when CiCC(∞) > v, then for Ψi large
enough also CiCC(0)(Ψ1,Ψ2) ≥ v for i = 1, 2. But this
means that (CC,CC) is an equilibrium in the game at the
second stage. Thus whenever Ψ1 < Ψ∗∗1 and Ψ2 < Ψ∗∗2 with
Ψ∗∗i satisfying CiCC(1)(Ψ∗∗1 ,Ψ∗∗2 ) = v, the outcome of the
Stackelberg game is that both players use 3G with probability
1, which gives the biggest value possible of the base station’s
utility. Now suppose that CiCC(∞) ≤ v. Then for any value
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Fig. 3. Price of anarchy between hierarchical and centralized scheme.
of Ψi, playing (CC,CC) is not an equilibrium in the game
of the second stage. Thus, to maximize the expected number
of players using 3G, the base station has to choose the Ψi
and Ψj in such a way that the equilibrium in the game of the
second stage was either (WC,WC) or (CC,WC) and the
3G BS utility function UBS (equal to β1e−λ1Ψ1 + β2e−λ2Ψ2
in the first case and βi + βje−λjΨj in the second one) is
the highest possible. This is done by solving the optimization
problems defined in the proposition (the first problem for the
case (WC,WC), the second one for (CC,WC)).
3) First note that whenever Ψ∗1 and Ψ∗2 are chosen as in (11),
(WC,WC) is an equilibrium. This is because CiWC(0) is
the conditional expectation of ciWC(hi) over the set H− :=
{ciWC(hi) ≤ v}, so it is definitely smaller than v. Similarly,
CiWC(1) is the conditional expectation of ciWC(hi) over the
set H+ := {ciWC(hi) ≥ v}, so it is bigger than v. Thus the
condition for (WC,WC) to be an equilibrium is definitely
satisfied.
Now note that whenever player i chooses Ψi < Ψ∗i at the
first stage, but continues to use policy WC in the second, he
loses ∫ Ψ∗i
Ψi
(v − ciWC(hi))λie
−λihi > 0.
Similarly, when he chooses Ψi > Ψ∗i he loses∫ Ψi
Ψ∗
i
(ciWC(hi)− v)λie
−λihi > 0.
On the other hand, when he changes both the Ψi and the policy
at the second stage, his utility is either v (when he plays WW )
or E[ciWC(hi)] (when he uses policy CC), which are clearly
both less than his current utility
P (hi ∈ H−)v + P (hi ∈ H+)E[c
i
WC(hi)|hi ∈ H+],
so (Ψ∗1,Ψ
∗
2) is an equilibrium choice.
The last thing we need to show is that there are Ψ∗1 and
Ψ∗2 satisfying (11). Let us construct functions7 Ψ̂i(Ψj) :=
{Ψi : c
i
WC(Ψi)(Ψj) = v}. It is immediate to see that since
all the functions cik are nondecreasing, Ψ̂i are non-increasing
functions from [0,∞) to itself. It is then obvious that the
graphs of these two functions: {(Ψ1,Ψ2) : Ψ1 = Ψ̂1(Ψ2)}
and {(Ψ1,Ψ2) : Ψ2 = Ψ̂2(Ψ1)} intersect, and thus (11) has a
solution.
B. Proof of Proposition 4
Before we prove Proposition 4, we need an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 1. For any s = 0, 1 the functions Ci[k,l](s)(Ψ)
(a) are decreasing in k, l,
(b) satisfy Ci[k+1,l](s)(Ψ) ≤ Ci[k,l+1](s)(Ψ),
(c) are increasing in Ψ.
Proof: First note that
F (r, q) :=
∑q
v=0
(
q
v
) ∫
[Ψ,∞)v×Rn−q−1×[0,Ψ)q−v
λn−1
log
(
1 + ph
σ2+p
∑r+v
j=1 hj
)
e−λ
∑n−1
j=1 hjdh1 . . . dhn−1
is decreasing in r.
Next, we need to show that8
F (r + 1, q) ≤ F (r, q + 1) ≤ F (r, q) for any r, q ≥ 0 (18)
7Here we use a convention that in the second bracket we give the value of
player j’s threshold, which appears in the definitions of ci
k
, but was omitted
so far.
8The first inequality will be used to prove part (b) of the lemma. The second
one is the monotonicity of F in q.
F (r, q+1) =
q+1∑
v=0
(
q + 1
v
)∫
[Ψ,∞)v×Rn−q−2×[0,Ψ)q−v+1
λn−1·
log
(
1 + ph
σ2+p
∑r+v
j=1 hj
)
e−λ
∑n−1
j=1 hjdh1 . . . dhn−1
=
q∑
v=0
(
q
v
)∫
[Ψ,∞)v×Rn−q−2×[0,Ψ)q−v
λn−2·
[∫ Ψ
0
log
(
1 +
ph
σ2 + p
∑r+v
j=1 hj
)
λe−λhr+v+1dhr+v+1
+
∫ ∞
Ψ
log
(
1 +
ph
σ2 + p
∑r+v+1
j=1 hj
)
λe−λhr+v+1dhr+v+1
]
e−λ
∑n−2
j=1 hjdh1 . . . dhr+vdhr+v+2 . . . dhn−1
≥
q∑
v=0
(
q
v
)∫
[Ψ,∞)v×Rn−q−2×[0,Ψ)q−v
λn−2
∫ ∞
0
log
(
1 +
ph
σ2 + p
∑r+v+1
j=1 hj
)
λe−λhr+v+1dhr+v+1
e−λ
∑n−2
j=1 hjdh1 . . . dhr+vdhr+v+2 . . . dhn−1
=
q∑
v=0
(
q
v
)∫
[Ψ,∞)v×Rn−q−1×[0,Ψ)q−v
λn−1·
log
(
1 + ph
σ2+p
∑r+v+1
j=1 hj
)
e−λ
∑n−1
j=1 hjdh1 . . . dhn−1
= F (r + 1, q)
The second inequality in (18) is proved analogously, only
the inequality[ ∫ Ψ
0 log
(
1 + ph
σ2+p
∑r+v
j=1 hj
)
λe−λhr+v+1dhr+v+1
+
∫ ∞
Ψ
log
(
1 +
ph
σ2 + p
∑r+v+1
j=1 hj
)
λe−λhr+v+1dhr+v+1
]
≤
∫ ∞
0
log
(
1 +
ph
σ2 + p
∑r+v
j=1 hj
)
λe−λhr+v+1dhr+v+1
is used instead of the one used above.
Now, to prove (a) of the lemma note that ci[k,l](h) is the
expected value of
∑l
q=0 β
q(1 − β)l−q
(
l
q
)
F (r, q) when r is
a random value with the binomial distribution Bin(k, β). As
distribution Bin(k + 1, β) strictly stochastically dominates
Bin(k, β), the expected value with respect to Bin(k + 1, β)
of any decreasing function is smaller than that with respect to
Bin(k, β) and thus
ci[k+1,l](h) < c
i
[k,l](h)
for any h ≥ 0. But, as Ci[k,l](0) and Ci[k,l](1) are conditional
expectations of ci[k,l](h) over some fixed sets, this immediately
implies that they are both decreasing in k. The fact that they
are decreasing in l is proved analogously – the only difference
is that the monotonicity of F in q (instead of the monotonicity
in r) is used.
To prove (b) first note that for any k, l ≥ 0
ci[k,l](h) =
k+l∑
p=0
βp(1− β)k+l−p
(
k + l
p
)
G(p, k, l),
where G(p, k, l) =
∑min{p,k}
a=max{0,p−l}
(ka)(
l
p−a)
(k+lp )
F (a, p − a).
Note however that G(p, k, l) is the expected value of
F (a, p − a) when a is a random variable with the hy-
pergeometric distribution Hypergeometric(k + l, k, p). Since
Hypergeometric(k + l + 1, k + 1, p) strictly stochastically
dominates Hypergeometric(k+l+1, k, p), and F (a, p−a) is by
(18) a decreasing function of a for any fixed p, G(p, k+1, l),
which is the expected value of F (a, p−a) with respect to that
first distribution is not bigger than G(p, k, l+1), which is the
expected value of F (a, p− a) with respect to the second one.
But this immediately implies that also
ci[k+1,l](h) = E
p∼Bin(k+l+1,β)[G(p, k + 1, l)]
≤ Ep∼Bin(k+l+1,β)[G(p, k, l + 1)] = ci[k,l+1](h).
The same arguments as in part (a) imply that this inequality
is preserved by Ci[k+1,l](s)(Ψ) and Ci[k,l+1](s)(Ψ).
To prove the last part of the lemma take Ψ1 < Ψ2 and
define for any q and α ∈ {0, 1, 2}q
Sα(Ψ1,Ψ2) = {(h1, . . . , hn−1) ∈ R
n−1 :
0 ≤ hj < Ψ1 if αj = 0,Ψ1 ≤ hj < Ψ2 if αj = 1,
Ψ2 ≤ hj if αj = 2}.
Note that Rn−1 =
⋃
α Sα(Ψ1,Ψ2). Next note that F (r, q)(Ψ1)
is the integral over Rn−1 of the function f1 defined on each
Sα(Ψ1,Ψ2) separately, as
log
(
1 +
ph
σ2 + p
∑
j≥1 hj
)
λn−1e−λ
∑n−1
j=1 hj .
On the other hand F (r, q)(Ψ2) is the integral over Rn−1 of
the function f2 defined on each Sα(Ψ1,Ψ2) separately, as
log
(
1 +
ph
σ2 + p
∑
j≥2 hj
)
λn−1e−λ
∑n−1
j=1 hj .
Clearly f1 < f2, and so F (r, q)(Ψ1) < F (r, q)(Ψ2) for any
r and q. This immediately implies that also ci[k,l](h)(Ψ1) <
ci[k,l](h)(Ψ2). However, note that since c
i
[k,l](h) are also in-
creasing in h: Similarly
Ci[k,l](0)(Ψ1) = E[c
i
[k,l](h)(Ψ1)|h < Ψ1]
≤ E[ci[k,l](h)(Ψ1)|h < Ψ2]
< E[ci[k,l](h)(Ψ2)|h < Ψ2]
= Ci[k,l](0)(Ψ2),
which ends the proof of lemma.
Now we are able to prove Proposition 4.
Proof: First note that it is clear from the definition of
ci[k,l](h) that this is an increasing function of h and thus
Ci[k,l](0) < C
i
[k,l](1) (19)
for any values of k and l. Next it is enough to check
the definition of Bayes-Nash equilibrium (inferring (19) and
Lemma 1 if needed) that the sets of inequalities appearing
in the proposition define respective equilibria. What is left
to show is that cases (a–f) cover all the possible situations.
Suppose that case (e) does not hold. Then, either
Ci[0,0](0) < v (20)
or there exists a k such that
Ci[k−1,n−k](0) ≥ v ≥ C
i
[k,n−k−1](0). (21)
Clearly (20) is covered by cases (a–c) of Proposition 4. On
the other hand (21) implies either case (d) of Proposition 4 or
the following inequality (here (19) is used):
Ci[k−1,n−k](0) ≥ v > C
i
[k,n−k−1](1),
which is exactly the case (f) of the proposition.
C. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof:
Part 1) is obvious. 2) Since when Ψ→∞, Ci[n−1,0](0)(Ψ)→
Ci[n−1,0](∞), then if C
i
[n−1,0](∞) > v, for Ψ large enough
also Ci[n−1,0](0)(Ψ) > v, which means that all the players
apply policy CC in equilibrium at the second stage of the
game. Thus whenever Ψ is big enough, the outcome of the
Stackelberg game is that all the players use 3G with probability
1, which gives the biggest value possible of the base station’s
utility.
Now suppose that Ci[n−1,0](∞) ≤ v. Then for any value
of Ψ, not every player uses policy CC at the equilibrium of
the game of the second stage. Thus, to maximize the UBS ,
the base station has to choose the Ψ in such a way that at
the equilibrium of the game of the second stage some (say
l) players would apply policy CC and some other (say k −
l) would apply WC, and that the base station’s utility was
the highest possible. This is done by solving the optimization
problems of finding the smallest Ψ such that the profile [k −
l, l] is an equilibrium in the game defined by this Ψ, that is
satisfying
Ci[l,k−l−1](1)(Ψ) ≥ v ≥ C
i
[l,k−l](1)(Ψ) and Ci[l−1,k−l](0)(Ψ) ≥ v.
However, as by Lemma 1 CiK(s)(Ψ) are increasing functions
of Ψ for any fixed K, this maximum is achieved for Ψ
satisfying (2b). When the values of UBS for each such Ψ
are computed, and the biggest one of them is chosen, this is
certainly the biggest value of the base station’s utility that can
be obtained in the Stackelberg scenario.
D. Proof of Corollary 5
Proof:
Let us assume that
k >
2
β
+ 1. (22)
First note that Ci[k−1,0](∞) is
k−1∑
r=0
βr(1− β)k−1−r
(
k − 1
r
)
E[log
(
1 +
ph
σ2 + p
∑r
j=1 hj
)
]
(23)
where h and h1, . . . , hk−1 are independent exponentially dis-
tributed random values with common parameter λ.
Next let r∗ = (k−1)β2 . Now (23) can be rewritten as∑
r<r∗
βr(1 − β)k−1−r
(
k − 1
r
)
E[log
(
1 +
ph
σ2 + p
∑r
j=1 hj
)
]
+
∑
r≥r∗
βr(1− β)k−1−r
(
k − 1
r
)
E[log
(
1 +
ph
σ2 + p
∑r
j=1 hj
)
].
Since the function E[log
(
1 + ph
σ2+p
∑
r
j=1 hj
)
] is clearly posi-
tive decreasing, the first element of this sum can be bounded
from above by
Prob[r < r∗]E[log
(
1 +
ph
σ2
)
],
where Prob[r < r∗] is the probability that a random value
with binomial distribution Bin(k − 1, β) is smaller than r∗.
This probability, using Hoeffding’s inequality [17] can be
bounded above by 12e
(k−1)β2
2 and thus the whole term by
1
2e
(k−1)β2
2 E[log
(
1 + ph
σ2
)
].
Analogously, the second element of the sum can be bounded
from above by
Prob[r ≥ r∗]E[log
(
1 +
ph
σ2 + p
∑r∗
j=1 hj
)
]
and further by
E[log
(
1 +
h∑r∗
j=1 hj
)
]. (24)
Now note that 1 + h∑r∗
j=1 hj
is a random value with Pareto
distribution [18, Chap. 20, Sec. 12] with parameters 1 and
r∗, whose average is (for r∗ > 1, which is guaranteed by our
assumption (22)) r∗
r∗−1 . Since logarithm is a concave function,
we can use Jensen’s inequality to bound (24) from above by
log
( r∗
r∗ − 1
)
= log
( (k − 1)β
(k − 1)β − 2
)
.
This implies that
Ci[k−1](∞) <
λ
2
e−
(k−1)β2
2
∫ ∞
0
log
(
1 +
ph
σ2
)
e−λhdh
+ log
( (k − 1)β
(k − 1)β − 2
)
and consequently that for any k such that the RHS of the
above inequality equals v the LHS will be smaller than v and
thus k > k∗.
